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NOT JUST ANY PRETEXT:  THE 2020 CENSUS 
AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
It was something out of a Dan Brown novel.  Parked outside of a 
convenience store, the estranged daughter of Dr. Thomas Hofeller, the 
“Michelangelo of gerrymandering,” Googles her father’s name and stumbles 
upon his weeks-old obituary.1  She visits her mother’s retirement home 
where, on a shelf in her father’s old room, she spots a plastic bag full of 
thumb drives that she hopes might have some old photographs on them.2  
Happily, they do.3  They also contain something else:  work product from her 
father’s days as a redistricting consultant, including a 2015 secret plan for 
Republicans to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census—and asserting 
that to do so would be “advantageous to Republicans and Non-Hispanic 
Whites in redistricting.”4 
Conspicuously, mere weeks before Hofeller’s archives made headlines, 
the Trump administration had appeared in front of the U.S. Supreme Court 
defending its decision to do exactly that.5  Its justification, however, was 
quite different.  It claimed the citizenship question was added in response to 
a Department of Justice (DOJ) request to aid its Voting Rights Act of 19656 
(VRA) enforcement efforts.7  It had neglected to disclose Hofeller’s 
“significant role” both in devising the strategy and crafting the VRA rationale 
 
 1. Michael Wines, Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard Drives Reveal New Details on the 
Census Citizenship Question, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us/census-citizenship-question-hofeller.html 
[https://perma.cc/L93W-TA3R]. 
 2. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for the Court to Issue Direction to Legislative Defendants at 
Exh. A at 6, Common Cause v. Lewis (N.C. Super. Ct. June 6, 2019) (No. 18-CVS014001). 
 3. Id. at Exh. A at 8. 
 4. NYIC Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order to Show Cause at 1, New York v. Dep’t of 
Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded 
sub nom. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (No. 18-cv-02921). 
 5. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 
2551 (2019) (No. 18-966). 
 6. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 
52 U.S.C.) 
 7. Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Com., U.S. Dep’t of Com. to Karen Dunn 
Kelley, Under Sec’y for Econ. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Com. 1 (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2018-03-26_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AYY-
C6B7]. 
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in a draft paragraph that DOJ had lifted verbatim into its request letter to 
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross.8 
Naturally, the Hofeller revelation was news to many—including, 
reportedly, the Chief Justice.9  After initially voting to uphold the question, 
Chief Justice Roberts subsequently defected to join the Court’s liberal wing 
on the narrow (but determinative) question of whether the VRA rationale was 
pretextual.10  Thus, while the challengers’ substantive claims failed, they 
eked out a procedural victory for one simple reason:  the VRA rationale was 
a lie.11 
For many, this “smoking gun” seemed rather quaint.  They had smelled 
smoke all along.  At the time, the Trump administration had yet to attempt to 
enforce the VRA; the suggestion that it “suddenly viewed minority voting 
rights as a priority” rang somewhat hollow.12  Further, the claim that adding 
the question would aid VRA enforcement was “both dubious as a policy 
proposition and indefensible as a practical matter.”13  Each of the civil rights 
groups “most fiercely advocating” for VRA enforcement loudly opposed 
adding the question.14  Finally, the administrative record revealed that the 
request had not originated at DOJ at all.  Despite sworn testimony that he had 
acted “solely” in response to DOJ’s request, Ross had actually scoured the 
executive branch for anyone willing to ask him to ask about citizenship,15 
eventually cajoling the DOJ to reflect his own request back to him.16 
But this was not just any pretext—it was a truly perverse one.  As this 
Comment argues, the Trump administration’s meddling in the 2020 Census 
is poised to have a dire impact on the very interests the VRA was designed 
to protect and the mechanisms by which it protects them.  Part I introduces 
the points of intersection between the census and the VRA.  Part II then 
details the Trump administration’s actions and their ongoing corrosive effect 
on the VRA’s foundational values.  Finally, Part III proposes steps that may 
soften the blow. 
I.  THE CENSUS AND THE VRA 
Importantly, it did not have to be a lie.  As discussed in this Part, in some 
parallel universe, it could have been plausible to suggest that collecting more 
 
 8. NYIC Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order to Show Cause, supra note 4, at 3. 
 9. See Joan Biskupic, Exclusive:  How John Roberts Killed the Census Citizenship 
Question, CNN (Sept. 12, 2019, 1:33PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/politics/john-
roberts-census-citizenship-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/K78V-CH26]. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019). 
 12. See Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux et al., “Contrived”:  The Voting Rights Act Pretext for 
the Trump Administration’s Failed Attempt to Add a Citizenship Question to the 2020 Census, 
38 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 322, 323 (2020). 
 13. Janai Nelson, Counting Change:  Ensuring an Inclusive Census for Communities of 
Color, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1403–04 (2019). 
 14. Justin Levitt, Citizenship and the Census, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1375–76 (2019). 
 15. New York v. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
 16. See Cepeda Derieux et al., supra note 12, at 333. 
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granular citizenship data would aid VRA enforcement.  First, Part I.A 
introduces the census; Part I.B then delves into its relationship with the VRA. 
A.  The Census 
Congress has delegated to the Department of Commerce the responsibility 
to conduct an “actual enumeration” every ten years, beginning on April 1, 
and to produce a tabulation of the number of persons residing in each state 
by the end of the year.17 
1.  How it Works 
The tabulation is used for many things, including the apportionment of 
congressional seats;18 redistricting;19 allocation of federal funding;20 and, 
yes, VRA enforcement.21  For apportionment, state populations are funneled 
through a convoluted formula that calculates states’ representative counts, 
which are then delivered to each governor.22  For redistricting, the U.S. 
Census Bureau (the “Bureau”) typically publishes block-level population 
data a few months into the following year, allowing states to expediently 
redraw their districts.23 
While the goal of each decennial census is simple—to count everyone 
residing in the country “once, only once and in the right place”24—executing 
that goal is trickier.25  Typically, gathering data takes about five months,26 
including (a) soliciting self-responses27 and (b) “Nonresponse Followup” 
(NRFU), which itself is comprised of several steps to correct for a missing 
 
 17. 13 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4, 21, 141(a). 
 18. See id. § 141(b). 
 19. See Levitt, supra note 14, at 1372. 
 20. See id. at 1357. 
 21. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 22. About Congressional Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/topics/public-sector/congressional-apportionment/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/YN56-4C7X] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021). 
 23. See Yurij Rudensky et al., How Changes to the 2020 Census Timeline Will Impact 
Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 4, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/research-reports/how-changes-2020-census-timeline-will-impact-redistricting 
[https://perma.cc/Y9JE-M9MQ]. 
 24. Ron Jarmin, Counting Everyone Once, Only Once and in the Right Place, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2018/11/ 
counting_everyoneon.html [https://perma.cc/B99Z-PYDW]. 
 25. See generally Operational Design Integration Models:  Supplement to the 2020 
Census Operational Plan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/program-management/planning-
docs/2020-oper-design-model.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS2N-C5AR]. 
 26. See generally 2020 Census Operational Timeline, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://2020census.gov/content/dam/2020census/materials/partners/2020-03/2020-census-
operational-timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7EM-CMKA] (last visited Apr. 16, 2021). 
 27. See Questions Asked on the Form, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://2020census.gov/en/about-questions.html [https://perma.cc/A2YL-AAR8] (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2021). 
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self-response.28  Self-responses are preferable—more accurate, more 
complete, and less onerous to obtain than NRFU data.29  After NRFU ends, 
the Bureau typically takes several months to process the data.30 
The Bureau also separately conducts the American Community Survey 
(ACS) on an annual basis, sampling only a small fraction of American 
households and covering a more extensive set of topics—including 
citizenship.31 
2.  Where It Fails:  Differential Undercount 
Given the enormity of these tasks, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
decennial census and the ACS remain chronically imperfect.  Their most 
significant flaw is the “differential undercount,” or disproportionate erasure, 
of racial and ethnic minorities.32  From 1940 to 1990, only one decennial 
census missed less than 5 percent of the Black population.33  The 2010 
Census (“one of the most accurate Censuses to date”) undercounted 2.1 
percent of the Black population, 1.5 percent of the Latinx population, and 4.9 
percent of the American Indian and Alaskan Native populations, while 
overcounting non-Hispanic whites by 0.8 percent.34 
To their credit, Bureau career experts are diligently transparent about 
this.35  Undercounts occur even absent “nefarious” interference, due, for 
example, to minority groups concentrating in high-density areas and being 
more transient, among other reasons.36  “Nefarious” forces matter too, such 
as fear of census responses being used against respondents.37  And naturally, 
many of the non-“nefarious” realities are themselves products of a broader 
 
 28. See New York v. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 
(2019). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Ron Jarmin, Update on 2020 Census Data Processing and Quality, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-
samplings/2020/11/update-2020-census-data-processing-and-quality.html 
[https://perma.cc/BFK7-4KNQ]. 
 31. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNDERSTANDING AND USING AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
SURVEY DATA:  WHAT RESEARCHERS NEED TO KNOW  1–2 (2020), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/acs/acs_researchers_
handbook_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3LW-M2F6]. 
 32. Nelson, supra note 13, at 1409–11. 
 33. Margo Anderson & Stephen E. Fienberg, The 2000 Census:  Litigation, Results, and 
Implications, 77 N.D. L. REV. 665, 669 (2001). 
 34. Nelson, supra note 13, at 1426. 
 35. See generally Counting the Hard to Count in a Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 
2019), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2019/demo/ 
Hard-to-Count-Populations-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3RV-V7B8]. 
 36. See Molly Danahy & Danielle Lang, Distortion in the Census:  America’s Oldest 
Gerrymander?, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 1065, 1072–73 (2019). 
 37. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2020 CENSUS BARRIERS, ATTITUDES, AND MOTIVATORS 
STUDY (CBAMS) SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUPS, 96–98 (2018), 
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/program-management/pmr-
materials/2019-02-01/5-cbams-survey-report-findings.pdf? [https://perma.cc/6XT4-AX23]; 
Levitt, supra note 14, at 1363; Counting the Hard to Count in a Census, supra note 35, at 4. 
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history of racism simultaneously outside the Bureau’s control while also 
inside its data.38 
B.  The VRA 
While the census remains inextricably mired in symptoms of 
discrimination, the VRA represents one of the most “successful pieces of 
civil rights legislation” ever taken to combat them.39  Designed to “banish 
the blight of racial discrimination in voting,”40 the VRA proscribes both overt 
electoral discrimination—e.g., literacy tests—as well as some of the “less 
blatant” tactics that “innovat[ive]” jurisdictions have honed in response to 
being robbed of their blunter instruments.41 
1.  Section 2 Vote Dilution Claims 
Among the more complex methods used by post-VRA redistricting 
authorities is to dilute the voting power of minority groups.42  Generally, this 
can be accomplished either by “cracking” the group among many districts in 
order to render it powerless within any one district, or “packing” it into as 
few districts as possible in order to cabin its influence.43 
Importantly, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. 
Holder44 to neuter Section 5 of the VRA’s effective45 prophylactic 
protections, which required problematic jurisdictions to preclear potentially 
discriminatory electoral actions, retroactive claims under Section 2 are now 
“almost all that is left of the” VRA.46  Thus, because, as Part I.B.2 explains, 
these claims live and die on census data, the only operative check on 
discriminatory redistricting is susceptible to the precise kinds of census 
meddling discussed in Part II. 
2.  The Census and Section 2 
Section 2 claimants must prove, under “the totality of circumstances,” that 
a protected class has “less opportunity than other members of the electorate 
to . . . elect representatives of their choice.”47  The Supreme Court has read 
 
 38. See Danahy & Lang, supra note 36, at 1072–73. 
 39. See AM. C.L. UNION, THE CASE FOR RESTORING AND UPDATING THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT 11 (2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/ 
aclu_2019_report_to_congress_on_the_voting_rights_act_final_for_submission.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/77QP-PKP4]. 
 40. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 41. See AM. C.L. UNION,  supra note 39, at 8. 
 42. See id. at 4. 
 43. See Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census:  How to Count, What to Count, Whom 
to Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755, 766 (2011). 
 44. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 45. See AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 39, at 14. 
 46. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1332 
(2016). 
 47. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). 
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three conditions—the Gingles factors—into this language.48  The group must 
be (1) “sufficiently large and geographically compact”; (2) “politically 
cohesive”; and (3) subject to drowning out by another politically cohesive 
voting bloc.49 
These inquiries—particularly Gingles 1—hinge on census data.  To satisfy 
Gingles 1, a group must “show that they could constitute more than half of 
the electorate in a district-sized population.”50  Such a claim typically relies51 
on block-level “citizen voting-age population” (CVAP) data that the Bureau 
calculates by scaling sampled ACS citizenship data across total population 
data derived from the decennial census.52  If a claimant cannot establish a 
sufficient minority population through this census data, the claim cannot 
proceed.53 
Because the ACS only surveys a few million Americans at a time, CVAP 
data is, at the best of times, imperfect estimates.54  And when the census is 
subject to the kind of manipulation chronicled in Part II, the likelihood 
increases that Gingles-sufficient minority populations that do, in fact, exist, 
are nonetheless absent from the data—thwarting those groups’ only path to 
proportional electoral representation. 
II.  DISENFRANCHISEMENT:  2020 
Enter Trump.  His administration’s 2020 Census meddling can be neatly 
dissected into discrete vignettes, which, as Part II.A illustrates, fit neatly Dr. 
Hofeller’s vision of advantaging non-Hispanic, white Republicans.55  And as 
Part II.B demonstrates, despite the VRA pretext that accompanied it, the 
2020 Census saga has instead undercut the VRA’s foundational values. 
A.  The 2020 Census 
That saga unfolded in three acts:  (1) the citizenship question; (2) the order 
to erase “illegal aliens” from the apportionment count; and (3) the Trump 
administration’s COVID-19 response. 
1.  Citizenship Question 
Secretary Ross’s directive to add the citizenship question circumvented the 
Bureau’s “robust” process for vetting prospective questions, disregarded 
 
 48. See Ellen Katz et. al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting:  Judicial Findings 
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 660 
(2006). 
 49. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). 
 50. Levitt, supra note 14, at 1376–77 (cataloguing the ways in which census data informs 
all three Gingles steps). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 31, at 17. 
 53. See Persily, supra note 43, at 778 (noting that Section 2 plaintiffs have occasionally 
satisfied Gingles 1 using total population instead of CVAP data). 
 54. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 31, at 1. 
 55. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
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Bureau and other administrative “guidelines and standards,”56 and flouted 
the Bureau’s forceful recommendation that the question not be added because 
it was, among other things, “likely to depress self-response rates.”57  
Although self-response is just the first step in decennial data collection, the 
record showed that NRFU was “at least as likely” to suffer from the same 
underlying problem as self-response:58  widespread fear that, amid 
aggressive anti-immigrant enforcement, census citizenship responses might 
be used against noncitizen respondents or noncitizen members of the 
respondent’s household or community.59 
Importantly, the resulting undercount would extend beyond noncitizens.  
“[B]oth citizens and non-citizens” would be undercounted, particularly 
citizens living with noncitizens.60  The question would be particularly 
sensitive for the 10 percent of households estimated to contain at least one 
noncitizen.61  This hammer “would fall most heavily on minority 
communities.”62 
Despite these concerns, a majority of the Supreme Court held that 
Secretary Ross had the substantive authority to add the question—if only his 
rationale had been truthful.63  Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court’s liberal 
wing to affirm the district court’s injunction on the narrow pretext issue 
only.64  After considering the Court’s invitation to proffer a fresh rationale, 
President Donald J. Trump instead issued an Executive Order (EO) for the 
Bureau to begin culling citizenship data from administrative records.65 
2.  Presidential Memorandum 
If the abundant evidence of pretext had left any doubt as to the true intent 
behind the citizenship question, the president’s July 2020 Presidential 
Memorandum (PM) summarily eliminated it.66  Having already directed 
Bureau officials to begin assembling citizenship data, the president was now 
ordering them to erase, for apportionment purposes, any “illegal aliens” it 
found.67 
While the COVID-19 pandemic ultimately delayed the Bureau’s 
apportionment calculation beyond the Trump presidency, and while 
 
 56. New York v. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
 57. Id. at 532. 
 58. Id. at 585. 
 59. See Matthew M. Welch, Privacy Law Concerns Associated with the Reintroduction of 
the Citizenship Question to the 2020 National Census, 10 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 11–12 
(2020) (documenting past weaponization of census data). 
 60. New York v. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 579, 584. 
 61. Id. (citation omitted). 
 62. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2584 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 2571–73 (majority opinion). 
 64. Id. at 2575. 
 65. Exec. Order No. 13,880, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,821 (July 11, 2019). 
 66. Excluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census, 
85 Fed. Reg. 44,679 (July 21, 2020). 
 67. Id. 
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President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. has subsequently revoked the PM,68 nothing 
can undo the “widespread confusion” that the PM—published months before 
the self-response deadline—created among affected communities “as to 
whether they should participate in the census,” further buoying differential 
undercount risks.69 
3.  COVID-19 Flip-Flop 
Perhaps the PM’s largest impact was to evaporate the Trump 
administration’s support for the Bureau’s COVID-19 extension requests.70  
The pandemic imposed “significant operational disruptions” on the 2020 
Census.71  The Bureau was “unable to hire and train enumerators,” faced with 
households “unwilling to answer their doors” for NRFU,72 and forced to 
grapple with mass relocation.73  While the Trump administration initially 
supported legislative efforts to extend the apportionment deadline, in July 
2020 it made an abrupt “about-face.”74  Immediately after the PM was issued, 
“there was suddenly a ‘push to complete NRFU asap,’” amid “drastically 
cut” deadlines from the Commerce Department.75 
This provoked near-universal derision from independent experts and 
agencies,76 former Bureau directors,77 the Inspector General,78 and civil 
rights groups,79 among others.  Nonetheless, unruffled by the prospect of 
 
 68. Hansi Lo Wang, Biden Ends Trump Census Policy, Ensuring All Persons Living in 
U.S. Are Counted, NPR (Jan. 20, 2021, 10:31 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/inauguration-day-live-updates/2021/01/20/958376223/biden-
to-end-trump-census-policy-ensuring-all-persons-living-in-u-s-are-counted 
[https://perma.cc/4SZ9-Q8Q7].  For analysis of the harm the PM would have caused, see 
Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 538 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 69. New York v. Trump, 485 F. Supp. 3d 422, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), vacated and 
remanded, 141 S. Ct. 530 (2020). 
 70. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NO. OIG-20-050-M, THE 
ACCELERATION OF THE CENSUS SCHEDULE INCREASES THE RISKS TO A COMPLETE AND 
ACCURATE 2020 CENSUS 7 (2020), https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-20-050-
M.pdf [https://perma.cc/W58Z-QW6S]. 
 71. Ross v. Nat’l Urb. League, 141 S. Ct. 18, 19 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 72. Response to Application for a Stay Pending Appeal at 8, Ross, 141 S. Ct. 18 (No. 
20A62). 
 73. See, e.g., D’Vera Cohn, It’s Clear Where College Students Are Counted in the 2020 




 74. See id.; Hansi Lo Wang, Census ‘Anomalies’ Could Thwart Trump’s Bid to Alter Next 
Electoral College, NPR (Nov. 19, 2020, 5:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/19/ 
936561664/anomalies-found-in-census-could-thwart-trumps-bid-to-alter-electoral-college 
[https://perma.cc/EQA6-CYZD]. 
 75. Response to Application for a Stay Pending Appeal, supra note 72, at 10, 12. 
 76. Id. at 12. 
 77. See Press Release, Vincent Barabba et al., Statement by Former U.S. Census Bureau 
Directors (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/7013550-Aug-4-2020-
Statement-By-Former-U-S-Census-Bureau.html [https://perma.cc/AP27-KX8Q]. 
 78. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 70, at 5. 
 79. Response to Application for a Stay Pending Appeal, supra note 72, at 33. 
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“materially larger” differential undercounts than even the 1990 Census,80 the 
Court sided with the Trump administration.81 
B.  Harm to Electoral Representation for Communities of Color 
And so the pattern of disadvantaging minority populations was allowed to 
continue.  As Part II.B explores, a cohesive strategy “to bolster white political 
power at the expense of communities of color” that began with a tall tale 
about VRA enforcement will instead subvert the VRA’s central mission:  
safeguarding minority electoral power.82 
1.  Differential Undercount 
The Trump administration’s interference is likely to beget a “huge 
undercount” in the 2020 Census.83  This undercount will likely be unevenly 
distributed84—there will, as always, be a differential undercount.85  Indeed, 
although the citizenship question is gone, its legacy survives; many of the 
concerns it aggravated predate the question itself, including persistent, 
virulent anti-immigrant sentiment.86  There also remain widespread 
misconceptions that the citizenship question did, in fact, appear on the 2020 
Census.87 
Accordingly, much of the projected differential undercount from the 
citizenship question is also likely to have survived, affecting both 
immigrants88 and citizens,89 particularly those within immigrant and 
“immigrant-adjacent communities”—“predominantly communities of 
color.”90  This will disproportionately affect Black residents, millions of 
whom “live in or near hard-to-count immigrant and noncitizen 
communities,”91 as well as Asian and Latinx residents, the two “largest 
group[s] of immigrating persons” in the United States.92  Even after the 
demise of both the citizenship question and the PM, the Bureau cannot go 
back in time and unchill self-responses from these groups. 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See generally Ross v. Nat’l Urb. League, 141 S. Ct. 18 (2020). 
 82. Cepeda Derieux et al., supra note 12, at 324–25. 
 83. See Sharon Driscoll-Stanford, How COVID-19 Makes the US Census Even More 
Challenging, FUTURITY (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.futurity.org/covid-19-us-census-united-
states-2433182-2/ [https://perma.cc/9KKP-HSEU]. 
 84. See Cepeda Derieux et al., supra note 12, at 357. 
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Nor can it undo the pandemic.  Projections rivaling 1990’s 4.6 percent 
Black undercount and 5 percent Hispanic undercount93 are consistent with 
the reality that minority groups are “disproportionately impacted by natural 
disasters and economic downturns, both of which fuel displacement and alter 
population growth patterns . . . which may result in the omission of their 
households in Census enumeration.”94 
2.  Resulting Representation Harms to Minority Groups 
The resulting harms to minority electoral power will manifest in at least 
three separate buckets:  apportionment, redistricting, and VRA enforcement. 
Apportionment.  The roots of the citizenship question extend back not just 
to Hofeller, but also to conversations between Secretary Ross and Trump ally 
Kris Kobach bemoaning the “problem” that “illegal aliens . . . are still 
counted for . . . apportionment.”95  While it remains too early “to quantify 
the precise impact on apportionment that the anticipated undercount” will 
have, there is broad consensus that it will wreak significant harm upon 
communities of color.96  The citizenship question was projected to “cause 
several jurisdictions to lose seats in . . .  apportionment.”97  Even without the 
question, if its legacy proves as resilient as experts predict, the resulting 
Latinx undercount will fall most heavily on the states with the largest 
populations of undocumented immigrants, including California and New 
York.98  Thus, “[d]espite fueling the nation’s growth from 2000 to 2010,” 
Latinx communities are now poised for a representation decrease in many 
areas.99 
They will not be alone.  About 10 percent of Black U.S. residents are 
immigrants; 42 percent of that group are noncitizens, while 15 percent are 
undocumented.100  California and New York—both at risk of losing seats—
are among the states with the largest Black populations.101  California is also 
home to nearly one-third of all Asian Americans.102  Accordingly, even 
without the PM, these populations are likely to suffer apportionment harm 
stemming from the differential undercount. 
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Redistricting.  These undercounts will also affect intrastate electoral 
power.  Because decennial population data guides redistricting efforts, “an 
inaccurate census could create [intrastate districts] that have nonuniform 
populations.”103  In particular, immigrant and immigrant-adjacent104 
communities—disproportionately of color105—stand to “drastically lose 
political power in intrastate redistricting” under a differential undercount.106 
Crucially, though, this is not just about undercounts.  As Hofeller 
emphasized, a “second, less well-known or covered but perhaps more 
central” goal is to pave a path for states to flout the “historic norm” of 
redistricting using total population and instead redistrict using CVAP 
data107—a novel practice108 of questionable constitutionality.109  Allowing 
districts to be drawn using only eligible voter counts would strip 
representation from the “urban and suburban areas where most Americans 
live”—particularly communities of color—and “boost representation in more 
sparsely populated regions.”110  The net effect:  to “recreate the disparities” 
that birthed the VRA in the first place.111  While the VRA’s protections only 
extend to eligible voters, the Trump administration’s decision to cloak this 
“cynical” attempt to dilute the representation of minority groups in VRA 
concerns still rings false.112 
Additionally, concerns about the EO do place this issue squarely within 
the VRA’s ambit.  The EO directed the Bureau to use administrative records 
to synthesize block-level CVAP data.113  Critics have worried that this data 
is “less accurate than [the Bureau’s] block-level total-population counts”—
with some citizens “erroneously treated as likely non-U.S. citizens.”114  If 
true, this would again disproportionately harm communities of color, who 
tend to have “higher concentrations of foreign-born residents” and greater 
numbers of citizens “vulnerable to being mischaracterized as likely non-U.S. 
citizens.”115  Thus, the electoral power of eligible voters of color would suffer 
relative to that of non-Hispanic white voters, particularly if the erosion in 
public trust stemming from this practice further exacerbates future self-
response inequities. 
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For now, President Biden has rescinded the EO.116  At the time of this 
publication, his administration has yet to clarify its stance on the Bureau’s 
collection of citizenship data through administrative records.117  There are 
legitimate arguments in favor of continuing to do so.  Career experts at the 
Bureau contend that, purely as a matter of statistical methodology, 
“combining multiple data sources, including administrative records and 
surveys, [could] produce better estimates than could be produced solely from 
ACS data.”118  But as a political matter, it may prove impossible to distill 
good-faith scientific discussions from the EO’s partisan poisoning of 
otherwise legitimate methodologies.119 
VRA Enforcement.  As a result, beyond its effect on the interests the VRA 
was enacted to protect, the Trump administration’s census meddling also 
risks harming VRA enforcement itself.  Section 2 claims were already 
becoming tougher to substantiate as U.S. cities diversify beyond the binary 
racial construct envisioned by the VRA,120 and as increasingly complex 
racial polarization in voting patterns have erected Gingles 2 and 3 hurdles.121 
The Trump administration has made things harder.  Section 2 claims rely 
on CVAP data deriving from the decennial census and the ACS, both of 
which have been impaired by the administration’s mischief.122  Citizenship 
ACS responses were already fickle:  almost one-third of ACS respondents 
whom administrative records reveal to be noncitizens represent themselves 
to be citizens on the ACS.123  And because the ACS is vulnerable to the same 
“systematic undercoverage” of hard-to-count groups as the decennial census, 
the decennial-differential undercount flames the Trump administration has 
fanned will spread to the ACS too.124  The upshot for cracked and packed 
communities:  many potential districts that should warrant VRA protection 
will nonetheless be absent from the data that Section 2 claimants need to 
satisfy the Gingles factors.125 
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III.  MITIGATION 
So what can be done?  The 2020 Census is over.  The inevitable differential 
undercount will skew apportionment and filter into redistricting and Section 
2 enforcement—all at the expense of communities of color.126  Still, there 
remain opportunities to mitigate the damage.  Part III proposes three such 
steps that can be taken in varying degrees of immediacy over the coming 
years. 
A.  Immediate:  Voting Rights Legislation 
While, as Part III.C discusses, the apportionment harms stemming from 
the 2020 Census are now irreversible, the redistricting and VRA enforcement 
harms are not.  To start, even if the 2020 Census cannot be undone, its 
redistricting and VRA harms can still be curtailed.  The Section 2 risks posed 
by the census all stem from one alterable premise:  we are asking too much 
of Section 2.127  Indeed, this was true even before the Supreme Court, on the 
eve of the first post-Shelby County redistricting cycle,128 took a case that may 
further defang Section 2.129 
Robust voting rights legislation can help.  Much has been written about the 
ongoing assault against ballot access and the valiant legislative attempts to 
parry these efforts.130  However, perhaps equally as impactful would be these 
bills’ checks on redistricting abuse.  Prior to Shelby County, sixteen states 
were required to preclear their redistricting plans.131  While this was by no 
means comprehensive, the chasm its absence creates—deepened by the 
Court’s holding, on the same day it struck down the citizenship question, that 
partisan gerrymandering is not justiciable132—cannot be fully measured until 
post-2020-Census redistricting has occurred.  The proposed Voting Rights 
Advancement Act133 (which passed the House of Representatives in 2019), 
if reintroduced and passed, would restore and strengthen VRA preclearance, 
taking pressure off of Section 2.134  The For The People Act of 2021,135 
which passed the House in March 2021, would go further by “ban[ning] 
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partisan gerrymandering,” establishing uniform “enhanced protections to 
make sure the political effectiveness of communities of color is not diluted,” 
and creating an “expedited” right of redress that would effectively replace 
Section 2 as the frontier for redistricting challenges.136 
If these bills pass, the barriers for Section 2 plaintiffs to satisfy the Gingles 
factors using suspect CVAP data will immediately become less important.  
While minority populations will still suffer from differential undercounts, 
those harms will not be compounded by districts methodically calibrated to 
pack or crack them into oblivion.137  Or at least their hopes to counter such 
attempts will not rest solely on imperfect CVAP data.138 
B.  Intermediate:  Privacy Protections 
Still, even if these bills become law, census data is likely to play some role 
under the new standards.  And that data will continue to be skewed by privacy 
concerns. 
A unifying theme throughout the 2020 Census saga has been the drain on 
self-responses attributable to fear that those responses will be used against 
respondents.139  These fears feast upon skepticism that confidential census 
data will in fact remain confidential.140  While there are stringent 
confidentiality assurances that make it a federal crime to release identifiable 
census data about respondents,141 such restrictions have not always 
prevented the Bureau from lawfully disclosing data in ways that have 
perpetuated public misgivings.142  At the very least, these breaches of public 
trust cannot be allowed to recur. 
But the more immediate risks to respondent privacy are actually 
aboveboard.  The ability to cross-reference public census data against public 
non-census data to reidentify individual census respondents is something that 
large-scale data operators (including the Bureau itself) have been able to 
accomplish in tests using 2010 decennial data.143  The Bureau must be 
empowered, and funded, to mobilize technical protections such as 
“differential privacy,” which provides functionally accurate data while 
preserving respondent confidentiality by injecting localized noise into census 
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products that smooths out at higher levels of generality.144  And—perhaps 
the tallest order of all—these efforts must be effectively communicated to a 
diffuse and distrustful public.145  Such steps are vital to avoid further eroding 
public trust, particularly among already hard-to-count populations, 
exacerbating self-response inequities and, as a result, differential undercount 
risks for communities of color.146  Crucially, although 2030 is years away, 
because these risks also apply to the ACS, they pose a perpetual CVAP threat. 
C.  Ultimate:  Reduce Reliance on Headcounts 
These issues also raise a larger question:  how much should the Bureau 
rely upon a traditional “census” at all?  For apportionment purposes, this 
question is currently settled, at least as a statutory matter—the apportionment 
count must flow from enumeration, rather than from any kind of “sampling” 
or statistical modeling, even if incorporating such practices can unlock 
greater accuracy than a naked enumeration attempt (including correcting for 
differential undercounts).147  Importantly, these restrictions apply only to 
apportionment; there is no statutory requirement tethering CVAP and 
redistricting data products to either the decennial count or the ACS.148 
This matters.  The 2020 Census cast an unflattering light on a problem it 
did not invent:  the challenges inherent to an actual headcount.  Those 
challenges lead to differential undercounts.149  Under current practices, 
despite the lack of a statutory mandate, those differential undercounts are 
permitted to permeate the Bureau’s data products—disproportionately 
erasing communities of color in block-level redistricting data and in the 
CVAP data that Section 2 plaintiffs rely on to secure electoral 
representation.150 
As counterintuitive as it may seem to those justifiably leery of the Trump 
administration’s motives for leveraging administrative records, communities 
of color could be better served by the Bureau relying more on other data 
sources and smart statistical modeling rather than on respondent-reliant 
headcounts inevitably hampered by differential undercount concerns.  
Among experts, there is significant optimism surrounding the prospect of 
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empowering Bureau experts to use more data, more intelligently,151 
particularly in light of the demonstrable differential undercount risks inherent 
to more traditional methods.152  Of course, as the reasonable concerns 
surrounding the EO demonstrate, such steps must be taken prudently—driven 
by expertise and insulated from the stench of politics.153 
CONCLUSION 
It is imperative to evaluate such reforms not only against perfection, but 
against a status quo that is widely accepted as flawed—flawed at the expense 
of Black, Latinx, Asian, Native, and other vulnerable populations.154  Reform 
is unlikely to be perfect, but paralysis in the face of predictable injustice is 
far more destructive. 
Meanwhile, for Americans of color, the representation harms—hefty as 
they are—are only part of the story.  Billions of dollars are allocated based 
on census data:  Medicaid, FEMA relief, and (of particular importance today) 
public health preparedness, among other things.155  To be erased from the 
census is to be discounted from these initiatives for an entire decade. 
And of course, without electoral power, it only gets harder to right these 
wrongs. 
 
 151. See, e.g., INNOVATIONS IN FEDERAL STATISTICS 31–37 (Robert M. Groves & Brian A. 
Harris-Kojetin eds., 2017) (ebook). 
 152. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 153. See supra notes 113–119 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra Parts II.A–B. 
 155. See Welch, supra note 59, at 15–16. 
